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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
Chrissy Shorter is a transgender woman who alleges she 
was stabbed and raped by a fellow inmate while in federal 
prison despite having warned prison officials repeatedly that 
she was concerned about being assaulted.  She brought a pro 
se suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), claiming officials 
violated her Eighth Amendment rights by displaying deliberate 
indifference to the substantial risk that another inmate would 
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assault her.  Invoking its authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 
and 1915A, the District Court dismissed her complaint sua 
sponte before allowing her to serve the defendants. 
 
Shorter argues on appeal that a Bivens remedy is 
available and that the District Court erred by ignoring relevant 
factual allegations and imposing a needlessly demanding 
standard on her pro se complaint.  The Government responds 
that we should not recognize a Bivens remedy in this context.   
 
Shorter has the better argument.  Her case falls 
comfortably within one of the few contexts in which the 
Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy.  And because 
Shorter adequately pleaded a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, the District Court erred in dismissing that claim 
so early in the proceeding.  We therefore reverse the dismissal 




Shorter is a transgender woman who has undergone 
hormone replacement therapy, meaning her body is “openly 
female.”1  J.A. at 81.  In June 2015, she entered the Federal 
Correctional Institution, Fort Dix to begin a 96-month sentence 
for creating a fraudulent “tax services” firm.  J.A. at 69; Gov. 
Br. at 3.  Although prison officials were aware that Shorter was 
 
1 Because we assume the complaint’s factual allegations are 
true at this stage, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), 
we describe the facts as Shorter reports them.  We take no 




transgender, they opted to house her in a room without a lock 
with 11 men.  Prison officials screened her risk for sexual 
assault under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
(“PREA”) regulations, and they concluded she was at 
“significantly” higher risk than other inmates because, among 
other reasons, she presented as transgender, was small in 
stature, and had previously been sexually assaulted at another 
prison facility.  J.A. at 137–38.  The screening report stated that 
Shorter “should not be housed with anyone perceived to be ‘at 
risk’ for sexual abuse perpetration” and would be monitored.  
Id. at 138. 
 
Despite these concerns, officials continued to house 
Shorter in a room without a lock with 11 men.  Worried this 
living situation put her at risk for sexual assault, she asked to 
move to a two-person cell instead, citing policies of the Bureau 
of Prisons (“BOP”) that supported her position.  After initially 
objecting to this request, the prison reversed course and moved 
her to a two-person cell. 
 
But the move did not fix the problem: the new cell also 
had no lock and was the furthest cell from the officer’s station.  
Shorter reported these issues to prison officials, along with 
other concerns about sexual harassment and assault, but they 
took no immediate steps to protect her.  Instead, her counselor 
compounded the problem by assigning a sex offender as her 
cellmate.  The sex offender was later removed from her cell, 
and Shorter followed up with a grievance to the warden. 
 
A few days later, Shorter again expressed concerns 
about sexual assault and submitted a request to transfer to a 
different prison, along with a BOP Program Statement 
supporting her request.  Demonstrating the depth of her 
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concern, Shorter requested a transfer from the low-security 
Fort Dix to a higher security facility, as she believed the latter 
would provide more protection against assault.  The transfer 
request asserted that Fort Dix was a particularly dangerous 
facility for her because it holds an unusually large number of 
sex offenders and does not permit locks on cell doors.  
Although the prison’s psychology department agreed Shorter 
should be transferred, she remained in the cell furthest from the 
officer’s station while her request was pending. 
 
Prison leadership took 17 days to act on Shorter’s 
transfer request.  On September 4, 2015, the BOP’s Gender 
Identity Dysphoria Committee decided Shorter should be 
transferred because there were “security concerns due to” her 
gender dysphoria and “the physical layout” of Fort Dix could 
not “provide the same type of supervision as in other 
institutions.”  Id. at 106.  Despite the apparent urgency of the 
situation, the warden took yet another 17 days before acting on 
the Committee’s recommendation and submitting a transfer 
request to the central BOP office.2   
 
Conditions in the prison only worsened as Shorter 
awaited transfer.  She continued to submit written materials to 
prison officials detailing her concerns.  And on October 5 and 
8, 2015, the associate warden distributed two memoranda 
suspending certain inmate privileges due in part to the recent 
“significant increase in security issues involving staff and 
inmate assaults.”  Id. at 71, 108–109.   
 
 
2 The documents attached to Shorter’s complaint suggest at 
least some portion of the delay may have been attributable to 
amendments she made to her transfer request. 
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On October 14, 2015, Shorter’s fears became real.  In 
the middle of the night, an inmate entered her cell, raped her, 
and cut her seven times.  After Shorter reported the incident, 
she was placed in involuntary protective custody.  The prison 
conducted what Shorter characterizes as a cursory 
investigation of the assault but did not substantiate her claims.  
On November 3, 2015, approximately two and a half months 
after her initial transfer request and four months after she first 
complained to prison officials about her living arrangement, 
officials finally transferred Shorter from Fort Dix.  She 
completed her sentence in 2019 and was released from 
custody. 
 
After exhausting administrative remedies, Shorter filed 
this pro se lawsuit alleging, among other claims, that prison 
officials (collectively, “Defendants”) were deliberately 
indifferent to the risk she would be seriously harmed in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The District Court 
screened her complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 
1915A(b), which provide that courts shall dismiss cases filed 
by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis that fail to state a 
claim on which relief can be granted.  The Court concluded 
Shorter had not stated an Eighth Amendment claim because 
she merely expressed “generalized fears of being at risk of 
sexual assault[,] . . . . but there were no specific threats against 
her that required the defendants to take measures to protect 
her.”  J.A. at 10.  The Court therefore dismissed her claim sua 
sponte before defendants were served.3  Shorter filed a pro se 
appeal and later obtained legal counsel. 
 
3 The District Court later dismissed Shorter’s other claims 
under the Fifth Amendment and the Federal Tort Claims Act.  




II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our 
review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure 
to state a claim, . . . like that for dismissal under [Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6), is plenary.”  Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. 
Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  And because 
Shorter’s complaint was filed pro se, we construe it liberally 
and hold it to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.”  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 
(2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation 




We analyze the viability of Shorter’s complaint in two 
steps.  First, we consider whether a Bivens remedy exists at all 
in the context of deliberate indifference to prison rape.  
Concluding that it does, we next consider whether Shorter’s 
complaint, in particular, was sufficiently pled to survive 
dismissal at this early stage.  See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 
88 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Bistrian II”) (“Whether a Bivens claim 
exists in a particular context is antecedent to the other questions 




A. Availability of a Bivens Remedy in This Context 
 
“Bivens is the short-hand name given to causes of action 
against federal officials for alleged constitutional violations.”  
Id.  In the case giving the doctrine its name, the Supreme Court 
held there is a cause of action for damages when a federal 
agent, acting under color of his authority, conducts an 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 397.  The Supreme 
Court subsequently recognized a Bivens remedy in two other 
contexts: gender discrimination in the employment context in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979), and certain types 
of prisoner mistreatment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, 
see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980) (addressing 
a claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 
medical needs). 
 
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994), the 
Supreme Court applied Carlson in recognizing an Eighth 
Amendment damages claim nearly identical to the one at issue 
here, involving prison officials who failed to keep a 
transgender prisoner safe from sexual assault.  The Farmer 
Court explained that the Eighth Amendment “imposes duties 
on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of 
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 
take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 
inmates.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Court held “a prison 
official can[] be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement [if he or 
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she] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 
or safety.”  Id. at 837.  This includes liability for displaying 
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that a prisoner will 
be attacked by other prisoners, because “[b]eing violently 
assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that 
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”  Id. 
at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).4 
 
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the Supreme 
Court summarized the status of Bivens jurisprudence.  The 
Court emphasized that, although the doctrine is a “settled,” 
“fixed principle in the law” in certain spheres, “expanding the 
Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”  Id. at 
1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).  
The Court then prescribed a two-pronged inquiry for courts to 
follow in deciding whether to recognize a Bivens remedy.  
First, they must evaluate whether a case presents “a 
new Bivens context,” meaning that it “is different in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the 
Supreme] Court.”  Id. at 1859.  The Abbasi Court named three 
previous cases in which a Bivens remedy has been recognized: 
Bivens itself, in addition to the above-referenced Davis and 
 
4 As we observed in Bistrian II, “[a]lthough the Farmer Court 
did not explicitly state that it was recognizing a Bivens claim, 
it not only vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the prison officials but also discussed at length ‘deliberate 
indifference’ as the legal standard to assess a Bivens claim, the 
standard by which all subsequent prisoner safety claims have 
been assessed.”  Bistrian II, 912 F.3d at 90–91 (citing Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 832–49).  We therefore concluded that the Farmer 
Court had “recognized” a Bivens damages remedy.  Id. at 91. 
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Carlson.  Id. at 1854–55.  “[M]eaningful” differences from 
those recognized contexts may include  
 
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right 
at issue; the generality or specificity of the official 
action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an 
officer should respond to the problem or emergency to 
be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate 
under which the officer was operating; the risk of 
disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning 
of other branches; or the presence of potential special 
factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider. 
 
Id. at 1860.  If a case does not present a new Bivens context, 
the inquiry ends there, and a Bivens remedy is available.  
Bistrian II, 912 F.3d at 91–92.  If, however, the case does 
present a new Bivens context, a court proceeds to the second 
step of the analysis and asks whether any “special factors 
counsel[] hesitation” in extending a Bivens remedy to that 
context.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 
 Defendants assert this case presents a new Bivens 
context and that special factors counsel hesitation before 
allowing a Bivens remedy here.  Our Court’s precedent in 
Bistrian II covers this argument.  912 F.3d at 89–94.  In that 
case, we considered a Bivens claim from a prisoner who was 
beaten by fellow inmates after they learned he was cooperating 
with a prison surveillance operation.  Like Shorter, Bistrian 
claimed prison officials had failed “to protect him from a 
substantial risk of serious injury at the hands of other inmates.”  
Id. at 88.  There, as here, the defendants contended Bistrian’s 
claim presented a new Bivens context.  We disagreed, 
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reiterating that under our case law and the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding precedent in Farmer, a federal prisoner “ha[s] a 
clearly established constitutional right to have prison officials 
protect him from inmate violence” and has a damages remedy 
when officials violate that right.  Id. at 90 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original).   
 
Because Bistrian’s claim was not meaningfully 
different from the claim at issue in Farmer, we concluded the 
latter case “practically dictate[d] our ruling” in the former.  Id. 
at 91.  So too here.5  Farmer made clear, in circumstances 
virtually indistinguishable from our case, that an Eighth 
Amendment Bivens remedy is available to a transgender 
prisoner who has been assaulted by a fellow inmate.  As 
 
5 After Abbasi, “lower courts c[an] no longer rely on their own 
prior precedents to recognize a Bivens remedy.” Mack v. Yost, 
968 F.3d 311, 319 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bistrian II, 912 F.3d 
at 95).  “Unless the Supreme Court has recognized the context 
before, the context is ‘new.’”  Id.  Our holding today does not 
run afoul of this precedent.  We do not rely on Bistrian II to 
recognize a Bivens context the Supreme Court has not 
recognized.  Instead, we rely on it solely for its holding that 
Farmer, which supplies the relevant Bivens context for our 
case, remains good law.  And Bistrian II was undisturbed by 
the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Hernandez v. 
Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), where the Court again referenced 
only Bivens, Davis, and Carlson as the cases in which a Bivens 
remedy has been recognized.  Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 741–
43.  However, the reasoning in Bistrian II—that the Supreme 
Court in Abbasi neglected to name Farmer because it saw that 
case as falling under the umbrella of Carlson—applies equally 
to Hernandez.  See Bistrian II, 912 F.3d at 91. 
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Shorter points out, her case and Farmer’s both involved (1) 
transitioning transgender women on estrogen who had 
developed female physical characteristics, (2) who were 
housed in allegedly unsafe cells in the general population of 
all-male prisons where assaults were frequent, (3) who were 
physically and sexually assaulted by fellow inmates, even after 
(4) prison officials admitted “a high probability” that they 
“could not safely function” in the prison due to their 
transgender status, and (5) who alleged that prison officials had 
therefore been deliberately indifferent to their safety.6  Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 830–31, 848; Shorter Br. at 3–10.  Defendants have 
pointed to no meaningful differences between the two cases.7  
And as we held in Bistrian II, Farmer remains good law.  Our 
case therefore does not present a new Bivens context. 
 
B. Sufficiency of Shorter’s Pleading 
 
Defendants argue that even if a Bivens remedy is 
theoretically available in Shorter’s case, it was nonetheless 
appropriate for the District Court to dismiss her complaint sua 
sponte at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 
and 1915A(b) because she failed to plead a claim under the 
Eighth Amendment.  We disagree. 
 
 
6 We do not suggest that this degree of factual similarity is 
required to conclude a case does not present a new Bivens 
context.  But the extent of the factual overlap between 
Shorter’s case and Farmer is indeed remarkable. 
7 Defendants cite the PREA as a potential distinguishing 
factor, but that statute, which cites Farmer favorably in its 
preamble, see 34 U.S.C. § 30301(13), does not make this a 




“At this early stage of the litigation,” “[w]e accept the 
facts alleged in [Shorter’s pro se] complaint as true,” “draw[] 
all reasonable inferences in [her] favor,” and “ask only whether 
[that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts 
sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim.”  
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).  
While it is proper for district courts to dismiss facially 
inadequate complaints sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B), premature dismissal under 
those statutes “deprives us of the benefit of defendant’s 
answering papers” and may result in the “wasteful . . . shuttling 
of the lawsuit between the district court and appellate courts.”  
Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
It was premature to dismiss Shorter’s complaint at the 
screening stage.  Construing her complaint liberally, accepting 
her factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in her favor, as we must, Shorter has stated an 
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.  That type of 
claim has three components: “an inmate must plead facts that 
show (1) [s]he was incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was 
deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to h[er] health 
and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused 
h[er] harm.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Bistrian I”).  Neither the District Court nor Defendants argue 
that Shorter failed to satisfy the first and third prongs; being 
sexually assaulted and stabbed indisputably pose a substantial 
risk of serious harm, and Shorter has alleged she was indeed 




Accordingly, only the second prong—whether the 
Defendants demonstrated “deliberate indifference to 
[Shorter’s] health or safety”—is at issue.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
834 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Deliberate 
indifference” is evaluated under a subjective standard; “the 
prison official-defendant must actually have known or been 
aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety” and disregarded 
that risk.  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125, 132 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  “Whether a prison official had the requisite 
knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to 
demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 
circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a 
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that 
the risk was obvious.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 
Shorter has adequately alleged that the Defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk she would be 
sexually assaulted.  First, her complaint alleges that she 
repeatedly told prison officials about the risks she faced at Fort 
Dix, campaigned to transfer facilities due to the unique threats 
posed by the layout and inmate population at Fort Dix coupled 
with her transgender status, and supplemented her grievances 
with specific references to supporting BOP policies.  It is 
difficult to imagine what more an unrepresented inmate could 
do to make prison officials aware of her risk of sexual assault.  
The District Court faulted Shorter for making “generalized” 
complaints that did not memorialize any particular threats of 
sexual assault by a specific inmate.  J.A. at 10.  But construed 
in the light most favorable to Shorter, the complaint plausibly 
alleges her grievances were not “generalized”; she gave many 
specific reasons why she was at high risk for becoming a sexual 
assault victim.  Further, a prisoner’s “failure to give advance 
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notice [of the risk to her safety] is not dispositive,” and a prison 
official may not “escape liability for deliberate indifference by 
showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial 
risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was 
especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who 
eventually committed the assault.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, 
848. 
 
Moreover, Shorter also alleged that the Defendants 
explicitly acknowledged her risk of sexual assault.  Prison 
officials evaluated that risk when she first entered Fort Dix, and 
they concluded she was at “significantly” higher risk than other 
inmates due to a variety of particular factors that included her 
transgender status.  J.A. at 69, 137–38.  Officials later 
recognized that she needed to be transferred to a different 
facility because there were “security concerns due to” her 
gender dysphoria, and “the physical layout” of Fort Dix could 
not “provide the same type of supervision as in other 
institutions.”  Id. at 106.  And in the days leading up to the 
attack on Shorter, prison officials posted notices throughout the 
prison warning about an increase in assaults.  Yet Shorter 
alleges the prison did little to mitigate these concerns, keeping 
her in a dangerous cell far from the officers’ station and even 
going so far as to place a known sex offender as her cellmate.8 
 
To be sure, Shorter’s claim may yet fail if the 
Defendants acted reasonably in response to the risk to her 
safety.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who 
 
8 In holding otherwise, the District Court relied primarily on 
distinguishable, non-precedential, or out-of-circuit cases, most 
of which were decided much later in the litigation process at 
the summary judgment stage.  See J.A. at 7–10. 
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actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety 
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably 
to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”).  We 
express no opinion on that fact-intensive question.  But Shorter 
has provided sufficient allegations of the Defendants’ 
deliberate indifference to proceed to the next stage in the 
litigation.9  Cf. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 
1997) (concluding that it was inappropriate to decide the 
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions even at the summary 
judgment stage because there were genuine disputes of 
material fact).  Dismissing Shorter’s Eighth Amendment claim 
at the screening stage—before discovery and before Shorter 
even had the chance to serve process—requires a remand.  
 
*    *    *    *    * 
 
 Extending a Bivens remedy to a new context is a 
disfavored judicial activity.  But Shorter’s case does not 
require any extension of Bivens.  Instead, her claim falls 
squarely within one of the Bivens contexts long recognized by 
the Supreme Court as discussed explicitly in our precedent.  
And Shorter’s pro se complaint, liberally construed, has 
plausibly alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  We 
 
9 Defendants also argue we should affirm the dismissal of the 
complaint on qualified immunity grounds, an issue the District 
Court never reached.  It is not obvious from the face of the 
complaint that qualified immunity applies, and we decline to 
reach this affirmative defense in the first instance.  See Plains 
All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 545 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“Generally, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we 
decline to consider an issue not passed upon below.”) (internal 
quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 
18 
 
therefore reverse the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim 
and remand. 
